I'm not sure how I feel about the Platonic Representation Hypothesis.
In some ways it seems like it should be profound, but part of me thinks it might just be saying 'There is an optimal way to perform dimensionality reduction and as things get bigger it is easier to appoximate'
It’s less profound sounding if instead of talking about “representations of the world” you talk about compressed representations of data or decision boundaries in a classifier over data.
Do memes have a concept of proto memes? Like primes are the proto numbers that all other numbers are made from? Could there be similar ontological primes for all concepts / semantic space? Base reality concepts that are irreducible so to speak.
Consider a binary tree of concepts from the root level more abstract concept to derived concepts applicable to specific domains. Do there exists additional derived concepts which are like an oblique plane which intersects the tree. Sort of like a concept which traveses maths, physics, biology, chemistry and intersects at different abstraction points. I am definitely sure language is flexible enough to have such entities.
I thought the platonic representation hypothesis was much more ambitious: wasn't it supposed to apply for any model across modalities (e.g. including human minds), rather than just the same model but with different modalities? I'll have to actually read the paper but I suspect there to be very strong assumptions which defeat the interesting aspects of the platonic representation hypothesis.
In some ways it seems like it should be profound, but part of me thinks it might just be saying 'There is an optimal way to perform dimensionality reduction and as things get bigger it is easier to appoximate'
What if one of them is a Republican and one is a Democrat? We already see this in some systems today.
More worrying, what if one is (for lack of a better word, what we might describe as) God and one is the Devil?